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Abstract 
This paper analyses the historical development of fisheries management systems 
within the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP): how resources are managed, 
how tasks are allocated by the Commission, and how quotas must be implemented. Early 
developments were based on the control of the fleet, aiming at the best compliance regarding 
catches by removing the overcapacity derived from the imbalance fleet/resources. The next 
developments focus on the allocation of national quotas and financial subsidies. Lastly, from 
the 2002 reform, the developments focus on managing the fishing effort according to the 
precautionary principle and the implementation of individual fishing rights. The document 
also deals with the different criteria implemented to strengthen this more and more open and 
competitive sector, with more liability for producers.  Finally, the author places particular 
emphasis on how to establish the different positions related to decision-making processes all 
through the period from 1983 to 2009, mainly with regard to micromanagement and 
regionalisation of fisheries. These recommendations would mean a change of mentality in 
reference to the principles of the Common Fisheries Policy.  
Keywords: Common Fisheries Policy; fisheries management systems; CFP reform 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is a complex set of means and actions. 
Its development and application have simply been a superimposition of texts aiming 
to cover a plethora of norms in order to reach pre-set objectives. However, results 
show that these are frequently not achieved. Professionals show little respect for 
regulations and controls. In short, the Common Fisheries Policy is characterised by 
evident laxness and several norms based on agreements made by a few.  
The main axes on which the CFP has been working set off from a very 
community view (with centralised features) to the current stage whereby the 
“rampant nationalisation” of coastal areas, subsidiarity in management, a growing 
rivalry between norms and objectives, a call for greater participation and the use of a 
scientific basis when putting resolutions into practice are predominant.  
The great diversity and heterogeneity of fishing gears and the high 
fragmentation and dispersion of agents leads to varying complexities. A great deal of 
scientific data is needed to make decisions and excessive conflicts of interest prevent 
any form of action.  
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Consequently, over the last years, there have been many decisions which 
change policies, measures and fishing actions. There have also been many debates 
focused on how responsibilities should be shared.   
This work aims to underline the various management models applied 
throughout the history of the Common Fisheries Policy, highlighting the key ideas of 
each period, the results and advances.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we review the 
theoretical basis of the CFP – competences, axes and mechanisms. The second 
section offers a classification of the phases of the CFP looking at management, 
changes and evolution which include the start-up stage and implementation of the 
first Common Fisheries Policy ( 1970 – 1983), characterised by management of 
short-term objectives. The second phase (1984- 1992) focused on trying to guarantee 
economic profits, quota mechanisms and TACS. MAGPs (Multi-Annual Guidance 
Programmes) were introduced. A new phase, from 1992, focused on questions 
relating to the fishing effort and its limits. Then we analyse the 2002 reform whereby 
objectives are managed long term and whose final engagement is the conservation 
and sustained exploitation of resources. In the following section, we evaluate the 
changes needed as regards vigilance and Community control and we look at co-
operation between Member States (as regards the CFP) from 2003 in order to fulfil 
the postulates of the aforementioned policy. Throughout the paper, we reflect on the 
coherence or incoherence of the CFP and summarise the key features of the future 
Common Fisheries Policy. Finally, in the section entitled “Conclusions”, we suggest 
possible solutions to the problems of control, follow-up and biological/ 
environmental questions. 
 
2. The Theoretical Basis of the Cfp 
 
The European Commission is competent as regards fishing matters. On the 
basis of its decisions, the principle of free access of fishermen between Member 
States is applied in line with the principle of non-discrimination and article 12 of the 
EC treaty. The Common Fisheries Policy is built around four pillars –resources 
policy, structures policy, commercial policy and external policy.  
The Management policy is established around three axes: a) defining and 
respecting TACs; b) adopting technical measures and c) reduction of fishing effort. 
The common fisheries system based on TACs and quotas was one of the first 
regulatory means adopted at an EU level. More than a hundred types of stocks are 
regulated by this system, covering most species of a common interest. This system is 
centralised and comes from scientific opinion provided by national technicians. 
These set the criteria to decide on quantities (although the final decision falls under 
the responsibility of policy-makers).  
TACs are proposed by the European Commission for Member States 
according to various species and areas which need to be managed, and they rely on 
the support of the Fisheries Management Committee. TACs respect the principle of 
relative stability (approved by the Member States in 1976) which gives each country 
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a fixed proportion of TACs, established for all stocks in each area. These are 
established depending on historic catches. By using this formula, an objective was 
set, i.e. to minimise the effects of catches whilst privileging economic interests in the 
short term.    
This mechanism was quickly called into question. Not only did the European 
Commission have its doubts ( 1991), but also scientists themselves, such as Charles-
Le Bihan (1995, 2003), Lequesne (2001), Boude, Boncoeur & Bailly (2001), 
González-Laxe (2002), Flaesch-Mougin (2003), Gray & Hatchard (2003), García 
(2004, 2005),  Boncoeur (2004), amongst others, noted the inefficiency as regards 
bio-economics. Likewise, the fishing dependency on certain local or territorial 
groups was not taken into consideration.  
 
3. Reclassification of the Phases of the Cfp 
3.1. The Early Years 
 
There were no reports on fishing activities until 1966 and, furthermore, until 
1970, there were no common actions linked to resource management, structural 
policies and norms related to a common organisation of markets. The first 
Regulation on this subject (2141/1970) came into force in 1970 when a Common 
Policy on the fishing sector came about.  Similarly, Regulation 101/76 established a 
Common Policy in the sector. Both mark the guidelines and establish a common 
organisation of markets, emulating the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Its aims 
were the following: increase productivity, stabilise the market, guarantee safety of 
provisions and ensure the prices of fishing products for consumers.  
As industrial fishing develops and extends, technological progress allows 
advances in stock detection, in the treatment and conservation of species and in the 
autonomy of vessels. Here, we note an increase in technical yield. This increase in 
catches affects the reproductive biomass of certain species (which reduces). There 
was the same social and economic impact in areas depending on fishing.   
The development of international relations equipped the EU with a Common 
Fisheries Policy, derived from the implementation of exclusive economic areas and 
the recent adhesion of the UK, Denmark and Ireland.  
Each Member State applied a national policy as regards the management 
norms in its areas and fishing zones as regards the conservation of resources. The 
direction applied by each Member State was a response to its own specific needs and 
each formulated its own aims and objectives.  
Once the exclusive economic areas were established at an international level, 
the aims of the CFP started to redefine themselves. Initially, measures were sought to 
guarantee fishermen sufficient income, as had been the case for the agricultural 
policy. At the same time, it was deemed correct to set access rules, structural policies 
and set up an organisation of common markets. In this way, internal discussion 
between Member States focused on different access conditions, on setting up help, 
on the mechanisms which established prices and on a common negotiating policy 
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with third world countries. Such discussions were formalised definitively when DG-
XIV was created in 1977. 
Firstly, we note that in the initial phase, the communal management system 
(1977-83) was controlled as seen in the following diagram. Each country took 
responsibility to keep an eye on the state of resources and the application of 
conservation rules of resources in order to meet and maintain the balance between 
fleets and resources, i.e. between capacity and possibilities (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Short term and static outline 
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 Secondly, economic help distributed via the FEOGA was used to promote 
and undertake the restructuration and modernisation of the vessels. And thirdly, the 
system of guidance and withdrawal prices guaranteed vital minimum income for 
sustaining the income of coastal populations and of those depending on fishing. This 
was more a minimum agreement than a Common Fisheries Policy. An agreement 
was needed to eventually deal with new adhesions and third world countries 
The management model aims for a functioning role, emulating the CAP. The 
basic aim is to maximise profitability, guarantee profitability of catches and be able 
to provide secure income to fishermen. Assigning quotas is the first step to sustain 
fishing prices. One can see that this closely resembles the CAP.  
 
3.2. Blue Europe 
 
From 1983, the new fisheries regulation introduced technical means as a 
complementary action. This was started after having analysed scientists’ work and it 
leans on fishermen’s experiences. It signifies therefore better understanding and 
consultation with professionals, even without a Regulation.  
One could argue that in this phase there is greater concern for biological 
risks. This supports the application of bio economic models whilst maintaining a 
guarantee of economic profitability. Regulation 170/83 highlights two major axes:  
a) adoption of management criteria and b) creation of various consultation and 
advisory councils. As regards the first of these axes, TACS and quotas were applied 
as were access means to waters and resources, forms of sector restructuration, rules 
of common commercialisation, means of application of price systems and 
importation regulations of fishing products. As regards the advisory councils, we 
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refer to the consulting committees for the sectors: the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES for scientific advice, the Centre for Study of Science, 
Technology and Policy (CSTEP) for advice and reporting on the situation of the 
sector, and the Management Committee for Fishery Products on the follow-up of the 
common organisation of markets.  
Regulation 170/83 was the framework for two lines of action. The first 
focused on technical means and the second on rule controls. In the former, we refer 
to the TAC and quota system as an “institutional solution” of regulating catches in 
community waters, in line with the principle of non-discrimination. However, such a 
system opens up conflicts between the fishermen themselves and situations emerge 
which involve the government’s resistance. One assumes that the economical 
context, social pressure and claims from national sovereignty overcome tensions 
through an “institutional decision of management”. As regards the second technical 
means, the Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs) aim to ensure successful 
restructuration and reduction of fishing fleets, trying to adapt the size of fleets to the 
catch capacity by encouraging boat modernisation and fishing procedures. 
Eventually, MAGPs end up being merely “reference means” as one tries to define 
the structural action of the CFP (Charles Le- Bihan, 1995) and do not prevent the 
conflict between fishermen and communal actions.  
By analysing rule controls, we see that this responsibility lies with the 
Member States and that accounts continue to show (amongst other issues) situations 
of over-fishing, excessive discards and dysfunctions between objectives (Lequesne, 
2001). The CFP claims that the final aim stems from the “search for social peace 
rather than the definition of a management model” (González-Laxe, 2002). 
The results of these measures were evaluated by the European Commission 
in Report 91 (SEC (91) 2288, 4 December 1991), where certain affirmations stood 
out. On one hand, the “ limited efficacy of policies established in 1983” were 
highlighted, the causes being professionals’ resistance to these policies, insufficient 
adoption of fleet specifications, ineffective and exhaustive controls, lack of statistics 
or precise objectives and unfulfilled projects. Equally, in Report 1991, it is suggested 
that policies focus on a “balance between fishing effort and available resources” and 
it is hoped that POP-III (1992-1996) responds to these questions and challenges.  
The Maastricht Treaty (signed 7 February 1992 and which came into effect 1 
January 1993) mentions the fishing sector, including it as one of management aims, 
like the CAP. The Treaty defined four basic references linked to fisheries 
management: a) it emphasises that the protection of the environment must be 
integrated into the EC’s definition of policies and actions (article 6); b) the EC 
environmental policies must be based on the precautionary principle ( article 174); c) 
the Common Fisheries Policy must take into account customers’ demands for 
protection (article159); and d) the aims fixed in the Treaty must have clauses linked 
to the cooperation with development (articles 177 and 178). Therefore, there is a 
quest for the consideration of various elements: factors deriving from biomass, 
technical means and opportunity costs. In this way, the scheme of functioning is not 
only based on elements which refer to questions of a biological nature but on those 
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that are connected to control variables and, above all, to factors of an economic 
nature linked to investment and profit (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Dynamic model and simple bioeconomic model 
 
 
Economic objectives are predominant as is obtaining ample, sufficient 
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3.3. The Nineties 
 
The third milestone of fisheries management considers fishing effort and its 
limits. This was accomplished in the early 90s when decisions relating to fishing 
effort and the setting/ completion of MAGPs were established, i.e. it corresponds to 
the period after the first revision of the CFP from 1992.  
Regulation 3760/92 sets the new common fishing and aquiculture regime. It 
has the same axes, the difference being that its aims were long term and its actions 
focused on technical and economic measures.  
In the preamble to this Regulation, it is said that “a rational and responsible 
exploitation of living aquatic resources (like in aquiculture) are desired...in line with 
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the Maastricht Treaty”. The following five points are redefined as aims of the CFP: 
a) protect and conserve living available and accessible aquatic resources; b) 
rational/responsible exploitation on a sustainable basis; c) maintain economic and 
social conditions which are appropriate for the sector; d) take into account the 
consequences for the marine world and e) take into consideration the needs of both 
producers and consumers. This means combining exploitation (rational and 
responsible) with environmental problems. This demands both a long term vision 
and structural reforms, having an influence on fishing effort and vessels, in the first 
case as a product of its capacity and activity and in the second, on those who exploit 
this and how it must be registered.   
For these reasons, many new rules on measures (which are already set up) 
and on new innovative measures are applied. As regards the former, the MAGPs 
(1992-96) are set from new calculations and determine the amount of help needed 
for the construction and modernisation to fulfil the aims of previous MAGPs. This 
gives the Council of Ministers the possibility to set TACs on a multi-annual basis 
and allows the interchange between Member States of some of the quotas of 
assigned species providing that the principle of relative stability is not modified as 
this ( as said previously) is the “ balance between the sides”.   
As regards new measures, the following, amongst others, are significant: a) 
the Commission can forbid fishing for a species in an area provided that the assigned 
quota has been exhausted (Regulation 1847/93); b) the aim is to increase control 
measures and harmonise sanctions using the European Commission inspectors 
(Regulation 2847/939); c) one can establish fishing licences or authorisation to limit 
the numbers of vessels operating in areas, thus also limiting fishing effort at the same 
time (Regulation 3690/93); d) a system is inaugurated to determine “ the length of 
time in the sea” for certain stock and areas; e) the aim to have more control through 
vigilance of boats via satellite  VMS (Regulation 2847/93); and f) for the first time, 
access conditions and minimum management rules are regulated in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Regulation 1626/94). 
There is a clear discrepancy between fishing efforts and fleet potential. The 
result reflects divergences in the structural policy when simultaneous indexes of 
overcapacity and overexploitation are seen (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Quantitative management level and level of business decision 
 
 
 
Consequently, the management models show certain failures in achieving 
MAGPs and dissimilar results in fisheries management are seen. The resource ceases 
to be communal and is linked to an almost definitive accession to a Member State. 
The management mechanisms entail various levels of actions paying attention to 
fleet and species segmentation and implications of requests. 
 
3.4. On The Basis Of The Fishing Effort And Performance 
 
The aims defined in Regulation 3760/92 have yet to be fulfilled. The 
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fishing activities and unbalanced distribution of resources; b) the need to preserve 
the equilibrium of resources in sensitive area; and c) better responsibility as regards 
the application of the regulation of fishing effort.   
Under this hypothesis, the measures set the levels of fishing effort of each 
fishery, both for those submitted to TAC and those which are not. They also affect 
levels of fishing effort which cannot affect the relative stability of fisheries and those 
which establish a new management model of fishing effort depending on the 
production capacity per day of fishing, vessel movement, tackle and fishing methods 
used. In this way, they try to deal with over-exploitation of resources, discards and 
adjustment mechanisms. 
In the European field, successive steps are made towards new distribution of 
quotas between the Member States themselves. Two questions are noteworthy: 
firstly some countries apply the principle of subsidiarity which consists of delegating 
to the Organisations of Producers a certain number of missions including activity 
control and the allocation of national quotas. Secondly, such differentiation between 
Member States occurs when exploiting a common resource, a common patrimony, 
but which eventually shows great heterogeneity as regards fishing efforts.  
Consequently, units of management are put into question. This being the 
case, objectives focus on gaining better performance (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Performance Model: aims to optimise production factors 
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Regulation 1624/95 encourages co-funding of national regimes for a 
collection for fishermen, granting global bonuses for each fisherman and the creation 
of a fund to help unemployment due to the elements or strong price fluctuations.  
This period was very fruitful for multinational negotiations thanks to the 
importance of fish in the High Seas, the problems of the exploitation of cross-border 
resources and highly migratory species.  
 
3.5. The 2002 Reform   
 
From 1998, agents were consulted on certain aspects linked to fishery 
management.   In March 2002, the Green Paper was presented where the efficiency 
objectives for the CFP were set out. This Green Paper was accompanied by several 
reports linked to the common fishing regime between 1993-2000 (SEC (2001) 418, 
419, 420, 20 March, 2001), on the economic and social situation of coastal regions 
and on the state of the possible evolution of resources. In May 2002, the European 
Commission presented the first series of reforms (COM (2002) 180, 181, 185, 
186,187 and 190, 28 May 2002). At the end of that year, the Council of Ministers of 
Fishing adopted the first set of measures, not exempt from controversy between 
those countries “Friends of fishing” (France, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) 
and those “Friends of fish” (countries in the North of Europe). The final agreement is 
Regulation 2371/2002, relating to the conservation and sustained exploitation of 
resources in the frame of the CFP. 
There are three aspects which need to be highlighted:  
Priority of multi-annual demands in the new formulation of fisheries. There 
is interaction between fishing activities and ecosystems, advocating a reduction in 
the pressure put on resources due to the principles of precaution, prevention and 
correction for sustained development. Of note is the affirmation “the absence of 
relevant scientific documentation must not be a pretext to not adapt or defer the 
adoption of management measures which tend to conserve key species, associated 
species and dependent species”. And, likewise, fish populations are put into three 
categories: those with minimum levels, optimum levels and maximum levels.  
The importance of scientific opinions to support decisions. It is hoped that 
these contrasted scientific contributions help to clarify the possibilities of fishing. 
Amassed knowledge, historic mortality rates and estimates of reproductive biomass 
means one can give advice for a higher percentage of reliability of fishing 
conditions.  
Agent participation; since fishing policy measures have been applied, social 
and economic agents have been left out of the consulting process. The disparities 
(both as regards estimating catches and accepting measures) have highlighted a real 
divorce and separation. This separation was also evident in areas which depend on 
fishing since fishing activities play a highly supportive role in the local economy.  
The 2002 reform opens up the discussion to new management schemes. 
Firstly, to the new principles of political action, and secondly to the new governance. 
For the former, one must take ecosystem principles into consideration. In the latter, 
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(following the Green Paper guidelines) there is higher participation and involvement 
of fishermen and they are given regional fishing advice.  
The new context is defined by a growing number of stocks which are being 
depleted or are beyond the biological safety limits. Landings drop as do their profits, 
jobs are suppressed and generate situations of uncertainty in economies which 
depend on fishing. The Green Paper of 2001 notes a lack of competiveness. To focus 
on this new step (the need for corrective measurements to restore stock productivity 
and the implementation of sustainable development), various elements of the CFP 
are set: a) to improve conservation and protection of the marine ecosystem; b) to 
integrate the CFP’s environmental dimension c) to increase players’ participation in 
the decision-making process; and d) to promote sustained fishing beyond community 
waters. 
Short term strategic approaches (which until now have been predominant) 
must become medium to long term, aiming to rebuild exhausted stocks. For this, 
recuperation plans of certain stocks were set up (cod, hake, sole, etc.) and multi-
annual objectives were also set. New measures, fishing techniques and appropriate 
control were put in place. To be able to reach objectives, help was limited which 
presumed an increase in fleet capacity, aiming for a balance between fishing effort 
and available resources.  
The 2002 reform aimed to focus on the “Roadmap” towards better controls 
(more uniform and more efficient) and more viable conditions to carry out activities. 
For this, control are strengthened (the European Agency of fishing control was 
created) and a synoptic table was introduced in line with the rules of the CFP.  
Finally, the CFP introduced the precautionary principle, founded on 
ecosystem management. It requires the co-ordination and coherence of management 
authorities and advocates increasing the selectivity of fishing gears as well as 
attenuating the environmental effects of setting it up (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Ecosystem model   
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borders or on the establishment of areas outside with strict controls to avoid and 
attenuate the presence of poachers). 
The implementation of the CFP needs a well-organised control structure and 
efficient vigilance and inspection means. Experience has shown an insufficient 
implementation, the lack of harmonisation as regards inspection/implementation 
activities, as well as poor coherence and consistency of norms.   
From 2003, the European Commission published its synoptic table where it 
indicates how CFP rules have been respected. A summary of these shows that a)  
most Member States have failed in their obligations with respect to reporting on 
catches; b) information received in the Commission is not always reliable; and c) 
there are numerous serious infractions committed by Member States fishermen. 
The 2002 reform opens up a double perspective. On one hand, Regulation 
2371/ 2002 includes a new European frame for which a “common system of control 
and implementation” has been introduced so one cannot give Member States alone 
the responsibility of control and implementation of the rules of the CFP. The reason 
stems from the fact that there are not enough common means to carry out such 
functions and secondly, the Member States are very cautious about pledging for a 
centralisation of decisions on behalf of the Commission. 
On the other hand, in Regulation 2371/2002, the principle is reaffirmed 
whereby Member States are responsible for setting up CFP rules on their own 
territory and waters (article 23.1 of Regulation 2371/2002) and moreover summons 
Member States to cooperate as a matter of obligation.  
Applying the collective set of norms and recommendations has incited 
investigators (OCDE, 1997, 2000) to classify both the control variables and control 
methods which are linked to regulating access to the resource. As can be seen in 
Table 1, using such means can create new problems, and occasionally, open up new 
disputes. 
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Table 1. Variables and control methods to regulate access to fishing resources 
Regulation Means  for access to the resource 
Control Variables  Means Control methods Means 
Fishing effort Determine  catches  Administrative character norms Financial means  
Licences Individual quotas 
Transferable 
individual 
authorisations 
Valuations and 
transferable 
individual 
authorisations  
 
Questions and problems which could arise from the afore-mentioned variables and methods 
1. The 
multidimensional 
concept of effort is 
complex in 
determining variables 
and the high 
substitution of 
components increases 
this complexity. 
2.  The permanent 
evolution of 
parameters of effort 
(through technical 
progress), increases 
the complexity and 
difficulty of 
calculations.  
1. Difficulty in 
controlling landings.  
2. Risk of increasing 
levels of landings 
(on the assumption 
that fishing tackle is 
poorly selective). 
1. Difficulty in setting 
up selection criteria of 
users.  
2. Difficulty 
adjusting, adapting 
and distributing the 
parts/quotas to each 
user.  
3. Non transferability 
makes  efficiency 
difficult 
1. Negative effects on 
the market which can 
accelerate the 
processes of 
concentration;  
2. Controversial 
social effects in 
employment, plans in 
social mobility and 
access options to a 
licence or 
authorisation.  
3. Problems of initial 
distribution of rights. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
 
It is clear that the European Commission has seen its power increase, 
acquiring (from the 2002 reform) more strength, playing a more active role (articles 
26.2; 26.3; and 26.4), and having more control measures (articles 27.1 and 27.2.). It 
aims to adopt urgent and preventative measurements when CFP rules have not been 
respected, to harmonise the application of regulations, apply the precautionary 
principles, and deal with environmental problems to remediate the disparity of 
control systems. It also focuses on managing an equal situation between Member 
States in order to be more efficient.  
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4.2. A Step Forward In The New Fisheries Policy: The New Reform Of 2009 
 
The strategy designed for a new Common Fisheries Policy came from the 
definition of new criteria on the conservation and exploitation of fishing resources 
(especially as regards the principles of precaution and ecosystem fishing) and on the 
application norms (exercising greater control and delegating more responsibility), as 
seen in the Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, (COM 
(2009) 163) presented at the start of 2009. In the same document, the 5 main faults 
are described: a) a continuous problem of excess fleet capacity; b) some imprecise 
political objectives which do not provide sufficient guidance as regards the adoption 
of decisions and their implementation; c) a system of decision-making which favours 
a short term approach; d) insufficient responsibility granted to the sector; and e) a 
lack of political will to guarantee rules compliance and poor performance on the 
sector’s part.  
New guidance was noted in the presentation of the revised CFP. On one 
hand, it is presumed one must accept the principle that “The fishing sector cannot be 
isolated from its larger maritime surroundings and other policies related to maritime 
activity”. In this sense, we interpret that fishing depends closely on access to 
maritime space and the existence of healthy marine ecosystems. And on the other 
hand, the reformulation of the CFP looks for new directions both as regards an 
integrated political aspect and an environmental pillar. In this context, imbalances 
are accepted as is the lack of coordinated actions. Previous postulates are redefined 
in such a way that they encompass new decisions and innovatory “Roadmaps”.  
It is not surprising therefore that new definitions were adopted. These are 
linked to the following: the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fishing 
resources, improving management of common fishing, the establishment of common 
frames for compilation, management and use of the data of the fishing sector, new 
indicators of the capacity of effort, inspection and control rules, mechanisms to 
reduce accessory catches and eliminate discard, acts to prevent and discourage 
illegal, undeclared and unregulated fishing, management means based on fishing 
rights, rules to obtain a balance between fishing capacity and fishing possibilities, 
and specific temporal actions to promote the restructuration of fishing fleets, 
amongst others (See Graph 1) 
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Graph 1 – Key aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy– 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the Community Fisheries Control Agency was set up. This was 
recognised in the regulation proposal of the Council which modified Regulation 
847/93, leading to a control regime at the CFP (COM (2004) 289 28 April, 2004), 
and was established on the basis of article 28 of Regulation 2371/002. It focuses on 
fixing the demands of cooperation and coordination between Member States, having 
to elaborate the forms of deployment of inspection means and controls available.  
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5. Is There Consisteny And Coherence In The Applied Measures? 
 
Coherence ensures the policy is coordinated, complemented and non-
contradictory. In the same way, the lack of coherence (or incoherence) in the policy 
highlights four highly significant elements: political decisions with negative effects, 
lack of information and transparency, unsuitable decision-making processes and lack 
of coordination between policies.   
In the field of fisheries management, coherence is analysed and examined 
through three axes a) the state of resources and the efficiency of measures to 
guarantee stock sustainability; b) dynamics of appropriation and management of the 
marine space as well as the allocation of fishing areas; and c) the producer’s 
economic rationality and the economic viability of production units. 
When defining the current situation of the fishing sector, Serge Garcia 
(2004) listed several characteristics. Firstly, users’ free access to fishing areas does 
not guarantee stock sustainability. Secondly, there are predominantly short-term 
concerns and a lack of transparency and responsibility of the public decisor as well 
as inefficient coercion mechanisms, scientific uncertainty and advice which is not 
publically recognised. Thirdly, players’ participation has been insufficient and 
investment in the fishing fleet has been oversized. Fourthly, communication between 
public administrations has been incomplete and disorganised. And finally, the lack of 
critical reflection has been the trend in the last decade. Having recognised these 
points, the results published by the  European Commission (2009) speak for 
themselves: a) 88% of fish populations of community waters are exploited above the 
maximum sustainable yield, which means that such populations could only be 
recovered if fishing pressure were reduced in the next few years; b) 30% of fish 
populations falls below the biological safety limits; and c) fleet reduction in the last 
years has been close to 2%, which is counteracted by technical progress incorporated 
in production units.  
The European Fisheries Policy was based on very simple principles. It had a 
linear character and was aimed towards the management of specific stocks in certain 
areas. Coordination between actions was not taken into account, and ambiguities 
between global objectives were obvious. Consequently, the effects and impacts on 
other principles and objectives were noticeably avoided. Likewise, the CFP was 
founded on the analysis that avoided creating interactions with territorial and market 
aspects. Finally, this had been alien to the incorporation of technological 
developments, such as detection and extraction as well as conservation and 
transformation. 
These characteristics show that the sectorial dynamics has been very focused 
on the short term and is clearly productive in nature, based on the political – 
diplomatic negotiation between Member States and focusing on strictly “ political” 
aims without taking into account coherence levels and divergence with great 
sectorial objectives  and economic policies (Grieve, 2001; Lequesne, 2001; 
González-Laxe, 2002; Gray & Hartchard, 2003; Symes, 2005, 2007; Frost & 
Lindebo, 2003; Frost & Andersen, 2006; Patterson & Resimont, 2007). To 
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summarise, one has underestimated the complexity and dynamic character of 
decisional processes and their incidence in policies and coherence levels with the 
remaining public policies (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Links between aims, characteristics and incidences of the CFP 
OBJECTIVES CHARACTERISTICS INCIDENCES 
Sustainability and 
ecosystem fishing  
Predominance of short term 
actions 
Lack of integral analysis in 
decision-making 
Simple, non-integrated 
management. Management per 
species is done but interaction 
between species and habitat is not 
taken into account 
Conservation and 
management of 
fishing resources 
Predominance of 
recommendations to produce on 
a short-term basis.  
Mechanisms of inefficient 
coercion  
Lack of responsibility of the 
user/ producer  
Scientific uncertainty  
Imbalance / lack of entente with 
structural actions, those linked to 
incentives or commerce, 
agreements with other countries 
and external help.  
Economic viability 
and competitiveness 
Insufficient participation of 
players 
Oversized investment  
Over-confidence in economic 
incentives to mitigate 
imbalances 
No consideration for 
technological incorporation and 
economic globalisation  
No analysis of the dynamics of 
mobility of productive factors and 
delocalisation  
Local incidence, 
employment and 
income 
Lack of impact analysis  
No analysis of territorial 
competitiveness and local 
viability  
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
 
6. Main Conclusions  
 
We note three relevant questions. The changes experienced in the oceanic 
order and the transformations carried out in management and regulation fishing 
strategies provide major institutional awareness when it comes down to finding 
solutions to the problems derived from the exhaustion of fish populations and to the 
proliferation of controversies and conflicts between fishermen, fleets and countries. 
(World Humanity Action Trust, 2000).  
The main responsibility of productive agents is expressed by adopting 
stricter and more responsible codes of conduct and the need to accept and comply 
with those regulations dictated by public authorities. This higher level of 
responsibility means that the original hypothesis considers biological and 
environmental questions as being a priority, cooperation as being necessary and 
maintaining economic viability of production units as being indispensable.  
Nevertheless, we must follow the following guidelines: 
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Ignorance of common projects. We note a clear refusal of the various levels 
of collective compromise. This generates a harmful situation both mid and long 
term.  
Distancing of common policies. This highlights the inequality in benefits, 
resulting in regional rivalries. The consequences of this bias propel localisms 
(isolation) or disconnection with processes of commercialisation (Apostle et alia, 
1998; Koiiman, 1999; Koiiman, Van Vliet and Jentoft, 1999).   
Risk of imbalance in final objectives. Lack of equilibrium between 
objectives and means increases the difficulty of adopting criteria which reduce and 
eliminate uncertainty. The low efficiency of vigilance mechanisms and the reduced 
harmonisation of sanctioned capacities of the States do not encourage an acceptation 
of common measures in all areas of fishing, favouring incoherent actions and 
behaviour.  
Under this perspective, the conceptual frame of fishing management is 
permanently evolving due to the progressive application of the precautionary 
principle, sustainability indicators and conceptualisations of eco-systems. The 
current fishing sector is facing a new situation – it is unaware of imbalances in the 
field of its activity, it faces new competencies which turn to new organisatory 
formulae and increasing levels of awareness to act in areas of ecosystems 
(Beddington et al, 2007). 
To conclude, first and foremost the new management models must conciliate 
the aims of biological, economic and social sustainability as regards resources and 
market positions, rejecting models which use isolated data and parameters. Secondly, 
management models must apply and have new (and common) approaches, be 
integral and simultaneous when micro economic aspects and references to markets 
with SWOT analysis are combined. Finally, one will be able to evaluate the 
behaviour of all fleets and fisheries. Thirdly, one must obtain better collaboration 
from professionals in their tasks of extraction and manipulation of fishing resources, 
as well as a more intense and regulated participation when adopting management 
tools and fishing regulations.  
The conservation and management of fishing resources shifts from being 
considered from a short-term perspective to a long-reaching one. This infers a 
modification of players’ strategies, and advances very slowly as the CFP and 
national policies of Member States have employed “subsidiary paternalism”.  
The successive reforms have been more than just simple reforms, signifying 
very significant changes. There is better harmonisation of norms and controls, 
aiming for efficient, harmonised and transparent application without repeals or 
exceptions as well as the demand for increased productivity and sustainability. They 
have aimed to resolve problems and existing dysfunctions and involved 
professionals in the production and definition of the CFP (although this was started 
through consulting institutions). Results show great disparities. 
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